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LAW v. NATIONAL SECURITY: WHEN LAWYERS
MAKE TERRORISM POLICY
William G. Hyland Jr.*
Never in the history of the United States [have] lawyers
had such extraordinary influence over war policy as they
did after 9/11.
Jack Goldsmith1
While the Constitution protects against invasions of indi-
vidual rights, it is not a suicide pact.
Justice Goldberg
2
ABSTRACT
Are lawyers strangling our government's ability to fight the first war of
the twenty-first century? Does judicial adventurism and the fear of liti-
gation undermine the War Against Terrorism? In essence, is our na-
tional security apparatus overlawyered? This article analyzes how
some lawyers have produced a synthetic "litigation culture" over the
war on terror. It argues that litigation concerning electronic surveil-
lance, interrogation and all manners of prisoner treatment has chilled
counterintelligence since 9/11.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Are lawyers strangling our government's ability to fight the
first war of the twenty-first century? Does judicial adventurism and
the fear of litigation undermine the war against terrorism? In essence,
is our national security apparatus overlawyered?3 Consider the
following:
* Salim Gherebi, an enemy combatant imprisoned at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is suing the President and
the Secretary of Defense for $100 million in compen-
satory damages and $1 billion in punitive damages
for violation of his rights under the U.S.
Constitution.4
* Saifullah Paracha, another suspected terrorist held
at Guantanamo, seeks a court order to improve his
3 Robert Novak, Just Say No to Terrorist Lawsuits, HUMAN EVENTS, November 17,
2005, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id= 10320&keywords=terrorit.
4 Id.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  248 2008
LAW v. NATIONAL SECURITY
mail delivery, medical treatment and establish judi-
cial review over "opportunities for exercise, communi-
cation, recreation, and worship."5
* Convicted terrorism conspirator Jose Padilla has
sued John Yoo, a former member of President Bush's
administration, claiming that Yoo's legal arguments
led to Padilla's alleged illegal detention at a Navy
brig.6 In the federal suit filed against former Justice
Department (now law Professor) John Yoo, Padilla
seeks $1 in damages and a judgment declaring that
the policies violated the Constitution.7
* A court in Paris convicted five former inmates of
Guantanamo Bay on terrorism-related charges, in-
cluding use of false passports to integrate into terror-
ist structures in Afghanistan.' A sixth man, who was
held for 17 months in a French prison awaiting trial,
was acquitted, claiming he traveled to Afghanistan
for "spiritual reasons."9 His lawyer said he would sue
for "reparations" from Washington for his client's
time at Guantanamo. 10
These cases represent a litigation explosion of over 174 law-
suits filed on behalf of disconsolate, terrorist prisoners, none of them
U.S. citizens. This article analyzes how a swarm of civil libertarian
lawyers have produced a synthetic "litigation culture" over the war on
terror." It argues that frivolous,12 agenda driven litigation concerning
5 Id.
6 Adam Liptak, Padilla Sues Former U.S. Lawyer Over Detention, NY TIMES, Jan.
5, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/washington/05padilla.
html?ei=5124&en=b14713fbaO2287dd&ex=1357275600&partner=permalink&ex
prod=permalink&pagewanted=print.
7 Id.; Padilla Gets 17-year Prison Sentence on Terror Charges, JURIST: LEGAL
NEWS AND RESEARCH, Jan. 22, 2008, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edulpaper
chase/2008/01/padilla-gets-17-year-prison-sentence-on.php.
8 Associated Press, Paris Court Convicts Five Former Inmates, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at A9.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Michael Barone, The Overlawyered War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 24,
2007, at 43, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/mbarone/2007/
09/16/the-criminalizing-of-warfare-has-brought-the-overlawyered-war.html.
12 The Supreme Court is now addressing "enemy combatant" status for the third
time. Legally baseless claims occur when the tribunal has already resolved the
issue and a party persists in advancing it. See Stok v. Miller, 888 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Visoly v. Security Pacific Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 491
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (advancing the guidelines that define frivolous claims as:
a) claims contradicted by overwhelming evidence and; b) undertaken primarily to
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electronic surveillance, interrogation and all manner of prisoner treat-
ment has chilled counterintelligence after 9/11.13 This fear of litigation
has created a paralyzing culture of risk aversion and legalism in the
intelligence establishments.1 4 These parsed and contextualized law-
suits, "lawfare,"1 5 are tantamount to legal harassment and have en-
cumbered executive decisions after 9/11.16 Government officials now
worry that their scrutinized war judgments will result in prosecution
by independent counsels, the Justice Department of future adminis-
trations, or international courts.
1 7
This article begs one, central question: Is America's struggle to
eject radical terrorists from our country being lawyered to death?1"
This 'litigation' issue has been the subject of frictional debate among
legal scholars and civil libertarians.19 The analysis here seeks to point
out difficulties the courts will encounter in reviewing national security
decisions during the war on terrorism,2 ° and postulates the following:
(1) prevention stops terrorist-induced catastrophes from happening;
(2) a strong Executive government is essential to secure enduring lib-
erty; (3) terrorist behavior is not simply a criminal act but an act of
war; (4) civil liberties, therefore, must sometimes yield in applying
rules of war to terrorist conflicts; and (5) unprecedented civil liberties
litigation is responsible for creating a "parallel legal system."
delay or prolong resolution of the litigation; c) legally baseless claims also occur
when the tribunal has already resolved the issue and a party persists in advancing
it; d) an absence of a justiciable claim of fact or law).
13 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 23.
14 Id. at 94.
15 Id. at 58 ("Lawfare is the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for
traditional military means to achieve an operational directive.")
16 Nearly 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered on 9/11, surpassing the previous
largest loss of life due to a single attack-the Beslan school massacre in North
Ossetia; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 311 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report]; Doug-
las A. Hass, Crafting Military Commissions Post-Hamdan: The Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, 82 IND. L.J. 1101 (2007).
17 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 12.
18 Deroy Murdock, Real Torture Is Over There, HUMAN EVENTS, June 8, 2007 http:/
/www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=21047.17.
19 Otis H. Stephens, Jr., Presidential Power, Judicial Deference, and the Status of
Detainees in an age of Terrorism, in AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 71, 71-75, (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells, eds.,
2004).
20 Brief of Retired Generals and Admirals, Washington Legal Foundation, Allied
Educational Foundation, and the National Defense Committee as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 5, Boumediene v. Bush, 2007 WL 2986451 (2006) (No.
06-1195).
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In short, the relevant question is not whether curtailing civil
liberties imposes costs, to which the answer is obvious: the question is
whether the costs exceed the benefits.21 In the aftermath of the vis-
ceral reaction to 9/11, our Constitution may be facing its greatest chal-
lenge. That reaction has entailed secret wiretapping and the return of
military tribunals. All of these activities have been implemented be-
cause we are at "war," but are we compromising our Constitution to do
So?22
A. The 'Overlawyered' War
In a recent Pew opinion poll, an overwhelming number of
Americans believe that Iraq and the War on Terror are the most im-
portant issues facing the United States.23 Moreover, only 29% of
Americans believe that the United States is winning the war on terror-
ism. 24 Thus, the stakes in this scholarly debate are unusually high: on
the national security side stands tens of thousands of lives, risk to eco-
nomic prosperity and perhaps our way of life; on the other side, are
threats to personal privacy, freedom and civil liberties. Critics believe
that the methods and rules of the pre-9/11 world will work against
post-9/11 terrorism.25 "This view is influenced by the experience of Vi-
etnam and Watergate, which saw the greater threat to freedom coming
from our own government rather than a foreign foe.'"26
Lawsuits and litigation can not capture the urgency of a na-
tional security crisis, such as 9/11.27 The corrosive circus that consti-
tuted the Zacarias Moussaoui trial exemplifies the danger in trying to
use normal courtroom rules to prosecute terrorists. 2' Due to this litiga-
tion apostasy, as one 9/11 Commissioner observed: "[t]he CIA is insti-
21 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 50-51 (2006).
22 Sarah M. Riley, Constitutional Crisis or Deja Vu? The War Power, The Bush
Administration and The War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701, 732-34 (2006).
23 Tim Rutten, CNN: Corrupt News Network, Los ANGELES TIMES, reprinted in
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A12-13, available at http://www.latimes.
com/entertainment/la-et- rutten 1 dec 01, 0,4122002. column?coll= la- home- center.
("In fact, if you lump the war into a category with terrorism and other foreign
policy issues, 40 % of Americans say foreign affairs are their biggest concern in the
election cycle. If you do something similar with all issues related to the economy,
31 % list those questions as their most worrisome issue.")
24 Only 29% of Americans Say U.S. is Winning War on Terrorism, GALLUP NEWS
SERVICE, June 22, 2007, www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27955.
25 JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS Viii (2006).
26 Id.
27 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 175.
28 Yoo, supra note 25, at xi.
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tutionally averse to risk," and lawyers are a big part of the problem.2 9
Michael Scheuer, the chief of the Bin Laden unit at the CIA observed,
"[t]here is no operation at the CIA that is conducted without approval
of lawyers. I can't go to the bathroom at the CIA without a lawyer."3"
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, himself a Yale-trained
lawyer, complained in a NSC meeting: "[a] lot of times lawyers domi-
nate our deliberations and we get in trouble down the line. When law-
yers get together they consider things in their sphere of expertise, but
they exclude a lot of issues that matter, like public relations, congres-
sional politics and diplomacy."3
Emblematic of this 'overlawyered' theme, former CIA director
George Tenet told 60 Minutes that when al Qaeda operative Khalid
Sheikh Mohammad was captured by U.S. agents in Pakistan, he scof-
fed at his captors: "I'll talk to you guys after I get to New York and see
my lawyer."3 2 In fact, "the CIA has become so wary of possible criminal
charges that it urges agents to buy insurance."3 3
Critics make a reasonable sounding case: we must trust courts
to make decisions on important social issues that check the excesses of
the Executive Branch, and it should be no different in war time.3 4
While this is an appealing argument, it has no legal basis in two hun-
dred years of history.3 5 Until 2004, courts had never reviewed a single
case of the military detention of an enemy alien held abroad during
wartime. 3
6
Some lawyers seek a radical reordering of our system for con-
ducting war.37 They demand a new role for courts in overseeing basic
military decisions.3" These lawsuits beget a sweeping criticism of the
legal system: that it has placed the Presidency in the throes of a litiga-
29 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 95; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT at 93.
30 GOLDSMITH supra note 1, at 130.
31 Id. at 132.
32 GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 255 (2007)
("Had that happened, I am confident that we would have obtained none of the
information he had in his head about imminent threats against the American
people.")
33 Barone, supra note 11, at 43.
34 Yoo, supra note 25, at 161.
35 Yoo, supra note 25, at 161-162.
36 Id. at 162 n.80 (citing Ex parte Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) ("The only case
that came close, that of General Yamashita in World War II, made it to the Su-
preme Court only because his military trial was held in the Philippines, at the
time an American possession.")).
37 Id. at 149.
38 Id.
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tion explosion over the war on terror.39 Legalists have leveled the
charges of "shredding the Constitution" at the Executive branch and
give new meaning to the term "fog of war."4 ° Some lawyers have mis-
takenly cast security as a rival to freedom.41 Freedom does not refer
simply to the absence of governmental restraint.42 More fundamen-
tally, it refers to the absence of fear, the spread of which is the terror-
ist objective.43
Let this article be clear, each action taken by the President, as
well as the Department of Justice and the war crimes tribunals, is
carefully targeted at a narrow class of individuals-terrorists. The
President's legal powers are focused against terrorists. The overriding
goal has been to prevent and disrupt terrorist activity by questioning,
investigating and arresting those who violate the law and threaten na-
tional security.44 According to Brad Berenson, a former associate
White House counsel, "[tihe President's response from 9/11 forward
was to use every power and means at his disposal to try to prevent
another attack."
45
Many highly criticized policies-the detention of unlawful com-
batants and their confinement at Guantanamo, trials by military com-
missions, and the terrorist surveillance program-are necessary
presidential tools on the war on terror. This article rejects the charge
that the President has disregarded the rule of law. Quite to the con-
trary, this administration has been strangled by law, and since 9/11
this war has been lawyered to death.46
The Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi, Hamdan and Rasul,
as well as the pending landmark cases of Boumediene v. Bush4" and
Al-Odah v. United States,48 represent an unprecedented jurisdictional
39 Joshua D. Kelner, The Anatomy of an Image: Unpacking the Case for Tort Re-
form 2006, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 261-62 (2006).
40 John Ashcroft, The War on Terrorism Has Not Eroded Civil Liberties, in CIVIL
LIBERTIES: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Auriana Ojeda ed., Greenhaven Press 2004).
41 Viet Dinh, Freedom and Security after September 11, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 399, 400 (2002).
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 401.
45 Dawn E. Johnsen, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional Context in
Constitutional Law, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, n.107 (2007).
46 Barone, supra note 11, at 43.
47 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
48Id.
20081
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intrusion by the federal courts far beyond their normal areas of
expertise.4 9
The policy debate over whether the war with Iraq is (a) justi-
fied, (b) a violation of international law, or (c) totally unrelated to war
with al Qaeda is a necessary debate, but it should have no effect on the
President's essential constitutional authority to conduct a war free
from the threat of litigation.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A 'WAR ON TERROR'
The extraordinary threat of terrorism calls for extraordinary
measures. Senator Saxby Chambliss echoed this sentiment: "[o]ur
prior concept of war has been completely altered, as we learned so
tragically on Sept. 11, 2001. We must address threats in a different
way."
50
Clearly a war on terror is not a traditional war. It will endure
without a legally clarifying surrender.5 1 Terrorists typically are not
"state actors" (although some states may sponsor terrorism).5 2 Ter-
rorists do not act in compliance with the rules of war. In fact, their
very philosophies and tactics are specifically designed to harm the ci-
vilians those rules and norms are meant to protect.5 3 Terrorists are
not easily identifiable, and consist of a myriad of groups, cells and
philosophies.5 4
Al Qaeda does not seek to confront and defeat its enemies'
armed forces on the battlefield. Instead, it seeks to achieve its political
aims by launching surprise attacks-primarily on civilian targets-us-
ing unconventional weapons, such as concealing bombs on trains or
using airplanes as guided missiles. 55 Al Qaeda seeks victory by demor-
alizing an enemy's society and coercing it to take desired action.5 6
Some have argued that the War on Terrorism is similar to the
War on Drugs, and the War on Poverty.57 These "Wars" also had non-
49 John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 574-75 (2005); Jules Lobel,
The Commander in Chief and the Courts, 37.1 PRES. STUDIES QUARTERLY 49
(2007).
50 R. Robin McDonald, Is Habeas Obsolete in the Age of Terrorism?, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Oct. 11, 2006.
51 George W. Will, Questions for Mukaskey, JEWISH WORLD REVIEW, September 20,
2007, available at www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/wil1092007.php3?printer-
friendly.
52 JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 7 (1999).
53 BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 34-36 (1998).
54 Id. at 4.
5 OLIVER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 52--54 (2004).
56 Id. at 55-57.
57 Yoo, supra note 25, at 578.
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state actors, such as drug cartels and organized crime groups.58 Yet,
September 11th is different in kind and degree.59 First, al Qaeda rep-
resents a foreign threat that originates outside the United States
rather than domestic forces. Al Qaeda may seek financial gain to fund
its terrorist operations, but monetary advancement is not its pur-
pose.6" Second, al Qaeda has proven that it is capable of inflicting a
degree of violence that crosses the line separating crime and war.61
These are just two reasons why the current judicial system is ill-
equipped to deal with the plethora of issues that surround war and
national security.
Thus, the traditional sense of "war" can hardly apply to a con-
flict against terrorism. Until 9/11, criminal law enforcement was the
predominant way of framing the struggle with terrorists. After Sep-
tember 11th, the focus had to shift towards more expansive terms. The
President declared this new narrative: "[t]he war against this enemy
is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of
the twenty-first century, and the calling of our generation."
62
In the past, wartime meant a traditional understanding of bat-
tle.63 There was a fixed period of hostilities, a known enemy and set
rules to follow.6 4 The conflict we currently face does not fit this mold.65
The Supreme Court seems to agree with this new definition of war. In
its most recent cases dealing with the War on Terror, the Court has
been reluctant to think of terrorism as a traditional war and even
more reluctant to apply the traditional law of war to a conceivably
never-ending conflict.
66
A. Law v. National Security
Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel, made the following observation on his trip to
Guantanamo Bay:
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 578-79.
61 Id.
62 Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1023 (2004) ("Terrorism was obvi-
ously not new with 9/11, nor were attacks by al Qaeda against Americans new on
that day. What changed was the framework through which they were seen.").
63 Sarah M. Riley, Constitutional Crisis or Deja Vu? The War Power, the Bush
Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701, 740 (2006).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Joanne Mariner, The Supreme Court, the Detainees and the War on Terrorism,
FINDLAW, July 5, 2004, http://writ.lp.findlaw.comlMariner/20040705.html.
2008]
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Perhaps the oddest thing about my fortieth-birthday trip
to GITMO and the naval brigs was that the plane was
full of lawyers... they dominated discussions on deten-
tion, military commissions, interrogation, GITMO and
many other controversial terrorism policies. . . the main
reason why lawyers were so involved is that the war it-
self was encumbered with legal restrictions as never
before.67
Goldsmith details in his new book, The Terror Presidency, how
CIA agents feared prosecution for the activities they performed in the
War on Terror.6" A failed prosecution or lawsuit, Goldsmith observed,
can produce devastating headlines and legal fees. It is not only law-
suits that counterterrorism officials are worried about, but also
threatened prosecution and grand jury proceedings.6 9
Prior to September 11, 2001 suspected terrorists were prose-
cuted under a law enforcement model based on the procedures of the
criminal justice system. 70 For example, Ramzi Yousef, the architect
behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, was tried and
convicted in U.S. District Court. 71 After 9/11, however, the emphasis
changed, and the rules associated with criminal trials yielded to mili-
tary exigency.7 2 The expanded use of presidential power in the imme-
diate aftermath of 9/11 reflects this basic shift to a military justice
model.
73
The Authorization for Use of Military Force Act (AUMF) that
Congress passed immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided
the President with the ability:
[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons. 4
The days when society considered terrorism a law enforcement
problem limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the federal
67 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 129-30.
68 Id. at 179.
69 Id.
70 Stephens, supra note 19, at 11.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Riley, supra note 22, at 732.
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judiciary will not return.75 The President emphasized the contrast be-
tween ordinary law and a state of exception when he said: "[a]fter the
chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our
enemies with legal papers. With those attacks, the terrorists and their
supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they
got."76
Curtailment of civil liberties in time of war, rightly or wrongly,
is a byproduct of warfare and survival of a nation. As Judge Learned
Hand concluded in remarks entitled The Spirit of Liberty delivered
during World War II: "[a] society in which men recognize no check
upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the pos-
session of only a savage few." 7
According to Goldsmith, there was a "daily clash inside
the.. .administration between fear of another attack, which drives offi-
cials into doing whatever they can to prevent it, and the countervailing
fear of violating the law, which checks their urge toward prevention.""
Goldsmith continued by stating every "weapon used by the U.S. mili-
tary, and most of the targets they are used against, are vetted and
cleared by lawyers in advance."79 In this respect, the national security
community resembles larger society: fear of lawsuits and frivolous liti-
gation. o This litigation culture has required the Central Intelligence
Agency to employ more than one hundred lawyers, while the Pentagon
has approximately 10,000 attorneys.8 "
While previous wars were traditionally viewed as "political in-
tercourse, carried on with other means," 2 the War on Terror has now
become a litigation haven for lawyers. Goldsmith concludes, "[n]ever in
the history of the United States had lawyers had such extraordinary
influence over war policy as they did after 9/11. "s3
Exceptional threats require exceptional methods that formal
litigation (discovery, motions, bond hearings, etc.) are not equipped to
75 Yoo, supra note 25, at 574.
76 Scheppele supra note 62 ("Terrorism was obviously not new with 9/11, nor were
attacks by al Qaeda against Americans new on that day. What changed was the
framework through which they were seen.").
77 WILLIAM REHNQUIST, INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES (1998), reprinted in CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES VS. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST- 9/11 WORLD at 27 (Katherine B. Darmer,
Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., Prometheus Books 2004).
78 Barone, supra note 11, at 43.
79 Id.
80 id.
81 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 91.
82 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael E. Howard & Peter Perret trans.)
(1976).
83 Barone, supra note 11, at 43.
2008]
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handle.8 4 In fact, one could argue that the judiciary may undermine,
rather than promote, national security policy in the War on Terrorism
by refusing to afford deference to the political branches.8 5 De novo ju-
dicial expansion into military tactics such as interrogation and pris-
oner of war status represent an unprecedented intrusion into the
Executive's traditional war powers. At the formal level, the decisions
in Rasul, Hamdi and Hamdan (discussed subsequently) required the
Supreme Court to, in effect, overrule judicial precedent from the end of
World War 11.86
Justice Clarence Thomas has summarized this position suc-
cinctly by explaining that the courts "lack the expertise and capacity to
second-guess" the battlefield decisions made by the military, and ulti-
mately the President.8 7 The design and operation of the Judiciary,
Thomas argues, gives it a weak institutional vantage point from which
to manage foreign affairs and achieve national security goals. To en-
sure the most effective national policy on terrorism, these decisions
should be allocated to the institution that has a structural advantage
in making such important decisions."8 Justice Thomas concludes that
because the federal Judiciary suffers institutional disadvantages with
regard to foreign affairs, it is a poor choice for that branch to carry out
national security policy.8 9
Litigation has also interfered with the President's need for se-
crecy. Gathering intelligence information, and other clandestine af-
fairs against nations, are all within the President's constitutional
responsibility for the security of the nation.90 Citizens, as well as law-
yers, have the right to criticize the conduct of foreign affairs. However,
the President has the right and the duty to strive for internal secrecy
in areas where disclosure may reasonably be thought to be inconsis-
tent with the national interest.9 A similar view was expressed in Chi-
cago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp. :92 "[t]he
President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
84 See generally George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/01/20060131-10.html.
85 See Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 574, 600 (2005).
86 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 780-81 (1950) (holding that German
nationals convicted by a U.S. military commission after World War II did not have
the right to the writ of habeas corpus).
87 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 513-14, 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88 Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 574, 591 (2005).
89 Id.
90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
91 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972).
92 Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are
not and ought not to be published to the world."93
III. MODERN PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE COURTS:
WORLD WAR II
The President has greater competence than the courts in na-
tional security matters-a position accepted by the Supreme Court in
the 1944 Japanese relocation case, Korematsu v. United States.94 The
Court observed that Congress is "reposing its confidence in this time of
war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must."95 The Korematsu
Court announced the principle that "the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger."96 In so doing, constitutional
limits on the President are relegated when the nation is perceived to
be in a state of emergency. The Court justified the exclusion order for
all persons of Japanese ancestry, because "authorities feared an inva-
sion... and felt constrained to take proper security measures."97 More-
over, the court reasoned that the military urgency of the situation
demanded the exclusion.98
Civil libertarians liken terrorist cases to the Korematsu case,
however, there is no parallel.99 The Japanese-Americans detained by
FDR were American citizens, not enemy combatants, whose disloyalty
was (wrongly) assumed because of their nationality. 100 Today, our mil-
itary has not detained anyone because they are Muslim or Arab, but
only those caught on the battlefield or working with al Qaeda.' 01
In the famous 1952 Steel Seizure10 2 case, Justice Jackson wrote
that "presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. '10 3 It is in this
context that the President's ability to dominate foreign policy is
maximized. 10 4
93 Id. at 111; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
94 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 220-23 (holding that the exclusion of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry
from West Coast areas was constitutional based on national security threats and
the exigencies of war).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Yoo, supra note 25, at 148.
101 Id.
102 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
103 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
104 JEREL ROSATI, AT ODDS WITH ONE ANOTHER: THE TENSION BETWEEN CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN TWENTIETH - CENTURY AMERICA, reprinted in
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John Yoo, the former Associate Attorney General and current
Professor of Law at UC-Berkeley, reinforced this view espoused by the
Steel Seizure case: "[e]ven if the Constitution's entrustment of the
Commander in Chief power to the President did not bestow upon him
the authority to make unilateral determinations regarding the disposi-
tion of captured enemies, the President would nevertheless enjoy such
a power by virtue of the broad sweep of the Vesting Clause."' °5
Thus, presidential foreign affairs powers in the Constitution
stem from the "Vesting Clause," which vests executive power in the
President. °6 Yoo extrapolates this position into the current debate
about Guantanamo Bay prisoners by stating that the "handling and
disposition of individuals captured during military operations requires
command-type decisions and the swift exercise of judgment that can
only be made by 'a single hand."" 7
A. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
The basis for expansive presidential war powers against terror-
ism is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) statute that
Congress passed immediately after 9/11.108 According to the text of
that statute, the "President is authorized to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001...
In the early stages of the War on Terror, Yoo wrote a cor-
roborating Justice Department memorandum concluding that the Con-
stitution vests the President with the plenary authority as
Commander-in-Chief to use military force abroad-especially in re-
sponse to grave national emergencies created by unforeseen attacks on
the people and territory of the United States." °
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM at 9
(David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2004).
105 Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation:
The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 69 n.39
(2007).
106 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
107 Wuerth, supra note 105, at 69 n.42; see THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander
Hamilton); see also John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 172 (1996) (defending
originalism in the interpretation of warpowers).
108 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
109 Id. at § 2 (a).
110 See generally Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, to Timothy Flannigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, on The President's
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and
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The AUMF recognized that exceptional threats require excep-
tional methods."' Ordinary criminal law is no longer sufficient to ad-
dress the nature of the exceptional threat posed by terrorist
organizations. Necessity, at times, requires suspension of ordinary law
and process. Facts and circumstances themselves, in addition to the
events of September 11th, require exceptional political and judicial
action. 1 1 2
Based on the AUMF, the President concluded that the Found-
ing Fathers vested the President with primary Constitutional author-
ity to defend the nation from foreign attack, because "the Executive
can act quickly, decisively, and flexibly as needed."" 3
In fact, Thomas Jefferson echoed this conclusion: "[t]he trans-
action of business with foreign nations is executive altogether"-a
view shared by Washington, Madison, Chief Justice John Jay and Al-
exander Hamilton." 4 Like Locke, Montesquieu, and other writers of
the time, Jefferson recognized that the entire business of "war" was by
nature "executive" in character. 1 15 He once wrote to Abigail Adams of
his decision to act on his own constitutional views, which were counter
to several lower federal courts:" 6
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [judges]. . . a
right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Execu-
tive to decide for them .... The judges, believing the law
constitutional, had a right to pass sentence of fine and
imprisonment; because that power was placed in their
hands by the Constitution. But the Executive, believing
the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the
Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001) in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAiB at 3 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Bratel eds., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2005).
111 See George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Ad-
dress (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/
01/20060131-10.html.
112 Thomas P. Crocker, Still Waiting for the Barbarians, What Is New about Post-
September 11 Exceptionalism?, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 303, 309 (2007).
113 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to William H.
Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http:ll www.usdoj.
gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper]; DOJ
White Paper, at 29.
114 Exercising Congress's Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Robert Turner, Pro-
fessor at Univ. of Va. School of Law).
115 Id.
116 Dawn E. Johnsen, Constitutional "Niches:" The Role of Institutional Context in
Constitutional Law, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1593 n.137 (2007).
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execution of it; because that power has been confided to
him by the Constitution. 117
Jefferson believed that a leaders' first duty was to protect the
country. He wrote this to a friend in 1810:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of
the high virtues of a good citizen, but it is not the high-
est. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving
our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To
lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written
law, would be to lose the law itself with life, liberty, prop-
erty, and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus
absurdly sacrificing the end to the means." 8
The current President repeated this historical sentiment, explaining
that while an emergency situation is in effect, "Congress must be able
to use broad language that effectively sanctions the President's use of
the core incidents of military force.""' The President continued by
stating Congress did precisely this "when it passed the AUMF on Sep-
tember 14-just three days after the deadly attacks on America. "120
B. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA)12 1 as the exclusive means by which the Executive branch
may conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
within the United States. 122 Specifically, FISA limits electronic sur-
veillance to investigations of a foreign power for the purpose of ob-
taining foreign intelligence information. 23 Congress included within
the definition of a "foreign power," not only a foreign government, but
also "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in prepa-
ration therefore."' 2 4
FISA also established two special courts: 1) The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court (FISC), which is comprised of eleven district
court judges appointed by the Chief Justice, and the Foreign Intelli-
117 Id.
'18 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 80.
119 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to William H.
Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf DOJ White Paper at 29.
120 Id.
121 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1790 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811).
122 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-63 (2000).
123 Id.
124 50 U.S.C.§ 1801(a).
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gence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), which includes three dis-
trict court of appeal judges appointed by the Chief Justice. 125
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act 126 made significant amend-
ments to FISA (discussed subsequently), and amended subsection
1804(a)(7)(B) to replace "the purpose" with "a significant purpose.' '12 7
The FISA statute now requires the certifying official to state "that a
significant purpose of the surveillance [or physical search] is to obtain
foreign intelligence information."' 28
Prior to FISA's enactment, virtually every court concluded that
the President had inherent power to conduct warrantless surveillance,
to collect foreign intelligence, and that such surveillance was an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 129 The Supreme
Court in United States v. United States District Court130 made clear
that the governmental interests in national security investigations
substantially differ from those in traditional criminal investiga-
tions.' This case, which remains a leading Supreme Court decision
in this area, addressed the "delicate question of the President's
power.. .to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security mat-
ters without prior judicial approval."' 32 The Court observed, "domestic
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical consid-
erations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime.' The gathering of se-
curity intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of
various sources and types of information."' 33
125 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (b).
126 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see Mayfield v. U.S., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or.
2007); see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint or for Summary Judgment, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, Mayfield v. U.S., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007)
(No. CV.04-1427-AA).
127 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
128 See ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.C. 2003) ("'The
amended FISA allows [the government] to obtain a surveillance or search order
where its primary purpose in making the request is to gather evidence to initiate a
criminal prosecution against the targeted foreign agent,' so long as the gathering
of foreign intelligence information remains 'a significant purpose'.") (citing In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 (2002)).
129 See, U.S. v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912-14 (4th Cir. 1980).
130 United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
131 Keith, 407 U.S. at 321-24; Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., 2007 WL 1750470;
Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).
132 Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.
133 Id. at 322.
20081
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  263 2008
264 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 7:3
In sum, FISA reflected Congress' effort to fashion a framework
by which the Executive branch could conduct electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of privacy and indi-
vidual rights.'14 In constructing this framework, Congress concluded
that warrantless surveillance is reasonable in relation to the need of
the government to gather intelligence versus the protected rights of
our citizens, as required by United States v. U.S. District Court.
135
1. In re Sealed Case
In the fall of 2002, the President gained a blunt new weapon in
the ongoing war on terror. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR) met for the first time in its twenty-four year
history to hear the government's appeal of a lower court's interpreta-
tion of FISA. 136 In re Sealed Case1 37 was the only decision ever issued
by the FICSR in its twenty-four-year history.
138
Briefly, the lower court had imposed certain requirements ac-
companying an order authorizing electronic surveillance of an "agent
of a foreign power," as defined in FISA. The FISCR court overruled
this lower court's decision and upheld the constitutionality of the USA
PATRIOT Act's "significant purpose" test.' 39 The FISCR focused on
the definition of "foreign intelligence information," which means infor-
mation that is "necessary to the ability of the United States to protect
against sabotage, international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."' 4 ° Be-
cause an "agent of a foreign power" may be anyone who knowingly en-
gages in clandestine intelligence on behalf of a foreign power, which
includes activities that may be a violation of criminal statutes, the
134 S. Rep. No. 95-604, (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916.
135 S. Rep. No. 95-701, (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980; Def.'s
Mem Supp. Summ. J., 2007 WL 1750470.
136 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
137 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Rev. 2002).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991); Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Go-
ing, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.
J. 1234, 1237 n.16 (2003).
139 The Patriot Act contains many important changes to FISA. The most signifi-
cant being that a search warrant could issue so long as "a significant purpose" of
the surveillance was foreign intelligence, as opposed to the previous standard of
'primary purpose' of the search; USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218;
George P. Varghese, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
140 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (e)(1)(B), (C).
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FISCR concluded that FISA was never meant to prohibit its use in
criminal cases.
14 1
Relying on the Supreme Court's historical distinction between
domestic security and foreign threats, as well as the "special needs"
cases in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court concluded that,
both before and after the USA PATRIOT Act amendment, FISA was
constitutional. 142
2. Most Recent "FISCR" Case (2007)
The most recent Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) case was decided on December 11, 2007. The American Civil
Liberties Union had asked the surveillance court to release some
records in August, 2007. The organization specifically asked for the
government's legal briefs and the court's opinions on the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA) wiretapping program. 143
The FISC court ruled that it would not make public its docu-
ments regarding the President's warrantless wiretapping program. In
another rare public opinion, the court reasoned that the public does
not have the right to view these documents because they deal with the
clandestine workings of national security agencies. 144 Writing for the
court, U.S. District Judge John D. Bates held that releasing the docu-
ments would reveal closely guarded secrets that enemies could used to
evade detection or disrupt intelligence activities. He concluded that,
"all these possible harms are real and significant and, quite frankly,
beyond debate.' 45
One of the key documents being sought was the court order
that allowed the President to bring the wiretapping program under
the court's purview. Previously, the so-called Terrorist Surveillance
Program (TSP) allowed investigators to monitor international phone
calls and e-mails to or from the United States without court over-
sight. 146 Judge Bates acknowledged that the public would benefit from
seeing the documents, but the dangers of releasing such sensitive
materials far outweighed that public benefit.' 47 The court reasoned
that releasing the documents would reveal national security secrets,
141 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 (b)(2)(A), (C).
142 Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J., 2007 WL 1750470.
143 Associated Press, Spy Court Won't Release Eavesdropping Documents, Dec. 11,
2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22203707/.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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sources could be revealed, and targets could be alerted and
compromised. 148
IV. LITIGATION, FISA AND THE PATRIOT ACT
A. The USA PATRIOT Act: Protecting (or Destroying) Freedom
through Executive Action?
14 9
The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for the full name of the
statute: "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism." It was signed
into law on October 26, 2001 and is 342 pages long, amending over
fifteen different statutes.'5
Congress passed the Act by overwhelming, bipartisan margins,
arming law enforcement with new tools to detect and prevent terror-
ism. The USA PATRIOT Act has been invaluable to the Department of
Justice's efforts to prevent terrorism and make America safer, while at
the same time preserving civil liberties. 5 ' Prior to its existence, laws
had failed to keep pace with technology. Now, for example, Section 209
of the Act treats unopened voicemail like unopened e-mail, rather than
as a telephone conversation.
In passing the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress simply took ex-
isting legal principles and retrofitted them to be applicable to a global
terrorist network. Many of the Act's tools have been used for decades
to fight organized crime. As Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) explained during
the floor debate about the Act: "[tihe FBI could get a wiretap to inves-
tigate the mafia, but they could not get one to investigate terrorists. To
put it bluntly, that was crazy! What's good for the mob should be good
for terrorists."'5 2
Until the law was changed under the USA PATRIOT Act,
Osama bin Laden could have made a telephone call from Waziristan to
Singapore. Despite the fact that it would have been carried by a fiber
optic cable that passed through the United States (like the vast major-
ity of long-distance calls), the government would not have been able to
148 Id.
149 CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, PROTECTING OR DEFENDING FREEDOM THROUGH LAW,
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 45-
46, (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds., 2004).
150 CLE Lecture, No. AV29627, Monroe County Bar Center for Education, THE
PATRIOT ACT: LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (Nov. 16, 2005), available
at https://content.westlegaledcenter.com/cl/programMaterial/MCBA/F89036C
_CL.pdf.
151 BANKS, supra note 149, at 45-46.
152 Cong. Rec., 10/25/01.
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listen without prior permission from FISA.'5 3 In the past, FISA had to
approve all interceptions of foreign-to-foreign communications through
American wires, fiber optic cables, or switching stations.15 4 With war-
rants to the FISA court backed up, as much as two thirds of potential
intelligence from U.S. eavesdropping capabilities was being lost.' 55
The USA PATRIOT Act expands all four traditional tools of
surveillance used by law enforcement-wiretaps, search warrants,
pen/trap orders and subpoenas. The Act has the following advantages
in the War on Terror that should be upheld on constitutional
challenge:
* For years, law enforcement has been able to use "rov-
ing wiretaps"156 to investigate ordinary crimes, in-
cluding drug offenses and racketeering. Because
international terrorists are trained to thwart surveil-
lance by rapidly changing locations and communica-
tion devices (cell phones), the Act authorized agents
to seek court permission to use the same techniques
in national security investigations to track
terrorists. 1
5 7
* To keep from tipping off suspects, the government
can petition a court to approve a "delayed-notice"
search warrant. A delayed-notice warrant is author-
ized by a judge to temporarily delay giving notice that
the search has been conducted. 158 Long before the
USA PATRIOT Act, the Supreme Court expressly
held in Dalia v. United States' 59 that covert entry
pursuant to a judicial warrant does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Since Dalia, three federal ap-
peals courts have considered the constitutionality of
delayed-notice search warrants, and all three have
upheld them.' 6 °
* The Act allows federal agents to seek a court order to
obtain business records in terrorism cases. Section
215 permits the FBI director to seek records from
153 Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Editorial, The Case for Surveillance, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT Sept. 3, 2007, at 84.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 A roving wiretap can be authorized by a federal judge to apply to a particular
suspect, rather than a particular phone or communications device.
157 CLE Lecture, supra note 150.
158 CLE Lecture, supra note 150; Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant At-
torney General, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, Sept. 22, 2004.
159 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
160 CLE Lecture, supra note 150.
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bookstores and libraries of books that a person has
purchased or read, or of his or her activities on a li-
brary's computer. 16 ' These records were sought in
criminal cases such as the investigation of the Zodiac
gunman, where police suspected the gunman was in-
spired by a Scottish occult poet, and wished to learn
who had checked the poet's books out of the
library. 162
Litigation has attempted to eviscerate the USA PATRIOT Act
through assertions that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure provisions.' 6 3 Yet, even before the Act was passed,
courts had made rulings in similar cases. In Smith v. Maryland16 4 the
Court upheld the government's use of pen registers, a practice that is
expanded by section 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Specifically, Smith
held that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy for pen regis-
ters, and hence no Fourth Amendment concern.
However, a District Court in the Ninth Circuit recently ruled
that some parts of the Act were unconstitutional. U.S. District Judge
Ann Aiken ruled that FISA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act,
now permits the President to conduct surveillance of citizens without
satisfying the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 165
In Mayfield v. United States,166 the plaintiffs alleged various
civil rights violations for unlawful arrest, search, and imprisonment
against four individual defendants.'6 7 Plaintiffs also brought a claim
under the Privacy Act, alleging that the defendants began "leaking"
information contained within the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation files to the national and international me-
161 Id. at 9; 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
162 CLE Lecture, supra note 150; Michele Orecklin, Checking What You Check
Out, TIME, May 12, 2003, at 34 ("Many librarians believe that the policy violates
the right to privacy... The Justice Department believes that librarians are over-
reacting. 'I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding and a sense of unjusti-
fied hysteria,' says Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh. Dinh says authorities
have always been able to obtain subpoenas to search library records. For instance,
a federal grand jury authorized searches in the mid-1990s to learn who had
checked out books mentioned in the Unabomber's manifesto. Those subpoenas,
however, were issued after officials provided a reasonable suspicion that the books
were related to a committed crime.").
163 BANKs, supra note 149, at 50.
'64 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979).
165 Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).
166 id.
167 Id. at 1026.
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dia regarding plaintiff Brandon Mayfield. 6 Specifically the District
Court held that the USA PATRIOT Act provisions authorizing surveil-
lance pursuant to FISA violated the Fourth Amendment by permitting
the Executive Branch to conduct surveillance and searches without
first proving that probable cause existed to believe that a crime had
been committed.1
6 9
The court went on to rule that the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its the government from conducting intrusive surveillance unless it
first obtains a warrant describing with particularity the things to be
seized as well as the place to be searched.17 ° The court concluded that
"the indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises
grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, and imposes a heavier responsibility on the court in its supervi-
sion of the fairness of procedures."171
B. Protect America Act
172
As an adjunct to THE PATRIOT Act, Congress passed the "Pro-
tect America Act" in August, 2007 to close a critical intelligence gap. 1
73
It was signed into law by the President, after being passed by the Sen-
ate. The measure, introduced by Senator McConnell as S. 1927, makes
a number of additions and modifications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1801.174
Specifically, the Protect America Act revised FISA in four sig-
nificant ways. First, the Act permits the intelligence community to ef-
fectively collect foreign intelligence on targets in foreign lands without
first receiving court approval. 175 Intelligence professionals will not
have to go to court in order to collect foreign intelligence on an over-
seas target who may be planning to attack the U.S.176 Second, the Act
requires the Attorney General to submit to the FISA court the proce-
dures by which the government determines that electronic surveil-
lance is directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1032.
170 Id. at 1023.
171 Id.
172 P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007.
173 The White House, Fact Sheet: FISA Legislation Necessary to Keep Our Nation
Safe, August 6, 2007, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/
12/20071217-3.html.
174 Elizabeth B. Bazan, P.L. 110-55, The Protect America Act of 2007: Modifica-
tions to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congressional Research Service,
August 23, 2007, available at http:/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34143.pdf.
175 Id.
176 The White House, supra note 173. The Act is set to expire on February 1,
2008.
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United States. 177 Third, it permits the Director of National Intelli-
gence and the Attorney General to direct third parties (i.e. telecommu-
nications companies) to provide the information, facilities, and
assistance necessary to conduct surveillance of foreign intelligence
targets located overseas. 178 Finally, the Act provides that no lawsuit
may be brought against any person or business for complying with a
directive to provide all information, facilities, or assistance necessary
to accomplish the acquisition of foreign intelligence gathering.
179
V: LITIGATION, ENEMY COMBATANTS AND GUANTANAMO
BAY
A. Rasul v. Bush'
Two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens were cap-
tured abroad during hostilities between the United States and the
Taliban.' 8 ' Since the beginning of 2002, the U.S. military has held
them at the naval base at Guantanamo Bay.' 8 2 The prisoners brought
actions contesting the legality and conditions of their confinement.'
8 3
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed their claims for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, ruled that the federal habeas statute did indeed confer jurisdic-
tion to hear challenges of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay.18 4 Justice
Scalia, however, filed a blistering dissent and concluded that the ma-
jority's determination that:
[T]he habeas statute.. .extends to aliens detained by the
United States military overseas, outside the sovereign
borders of the United States and beyond the territorial
jurisdictions of all its courts... is not only a novel hold-
ing; it contradicts a half-century-old precedent on which
the military undoubtedly relied. . .The Court's conten-
tion.. .is implausible in the extreme. This is an irrespon-
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
181 Id.
182 The United States occupies the base, which comprises 45 square miles of land
and water along the southeast coast of Cuba, pursuant to a 1903 Lease Agreement
executed with the newly independent Republic of Cuba in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War.
183 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
184 Id.
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sible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme
importance to our forces currently in the field."8 5
Scalia went on to reason that the court's departure from stare
decisis will have a potentially harmful effect upon the Nation's conduc-
tion of war. If Congress had wished to change judges' habeas jurisdic-
tion, Scalia wrote, it could have done so by intelligent revision of the
statute, "instead of by today's clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation
that confers upon wartime prisoners greater habeas rights than do-
mestic detainees." Scalia concluded: "For this Court to create such a
monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our military
commanders' reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adven-
turism of the worst sort. I dissent."1 8 6
B. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld18 7
In 2004, Northern Alliance troops, a coalition of groups allied
with the United States and opposed to the Taliban, captured Yaser
Hamdi in Afghanistan and turned him over to U.S. armed forces. The
military sent Hamdi to the naval station at Guantanamo Bay. Upon
discovery that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was transferred to a naval
brig in South Carolina.18 8
Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking his son's
release, claiming that as an American citizen Hamdi could not be held
without criminal charges, access to a tribunal or legal counsel. He
based his argument on 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which declares, "No citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress." 8 9
The government did not challenge Hamdi's right to seek
habeas relief; instead, it argued that he was detained lawfully as an
enemy combatant under the laws of war.190 To support its contention,
the government submitted a declaration from a Defense Department
official stating that Hamdi had traveled to Afghanistan in the summer
of 2001, affiliated himself with a Taliban military unit, and surren-
dered while armed. 191
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Government
could detain Hamdi as an "enemy combatant." It determined, however,
that he must receive due process of law in order to challenge this des-
185 Id. at 488.
186 Id.
187 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
188 See id.
189 Id at 542.
190 Id at 510.
191 See id. at 512-13. The Supreme Court refers to this document as the Mobbs
Declaration.
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ignation. 192 Most significantly, the majority made it clear that it would
not consider military decisions in wartime to be outside the compe-
tence of the federal courts.
193
This expansion of judicial review and intrusive litigation into
military decisions represents unprecedented interference by the fed-
eral courts into the Executive's traditional powers. At the formal level,
the decision in Hamdi required the Court to effectively overrule a
string of judicial precedents dating back to World War II. 19' Yet, the
Supreme Court did accept the political branches decision to character-
ize the September 11th attacks as war.' 95 The Court rejected argu-
ments characterizing terrorism solely as criminal activity and denied
the notion that war could occur only against nations. 9 6 The Court
held, "[T]he capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by
'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of
war."' 9 7 The Court also ruled that the Afghanistan conflict was part of
the War on Terrorism, and that enemy combatants could be detained
without formal criminal charge. The Court determined that prevent-
ing a combatant's ability to return to the battlefield was a fundamen-
tal incident of war, and thus no specific congressional authorization for
detention was needed.
198
Hamdi argued that his detention was unconstitutional because
it was indefinite. The Court flatly rejected this argument. 1 99 The Jus-
tices recognized that the United States was waging war with a new
kind of enemy, one that is without a set territory or population, and
with no desire to spare civilian life.2 0 0 Accordingly, the Court held that
the government could detain prisoners until the end of a conflict:
"IT]he purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from re-
turning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again."2 0 1 In the
past, there had been no inclination towards defining a fixed detain-
192 See id. 564.
193 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564.
194 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950) (holding that German
nationals convicted by a U.S. military commission after World War II did not have
the right to the writ of habeas corpus).
195 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
196 See Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, 17 n.8, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 No. 2-6696
(2004); Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004) (ar-
guing that the post-September 11 denouement constitutes a "state of emergency"
rather than an outright "war").
197 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
198 Id. at 521.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 520.
201 Id.
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ment period during war, until the Hamdi court suggested it might cre-
ate one for the first time in history. 20 2
The Court's decision to grant Hamdi due process rights is a
flawed one. By introducing a lawyer to a prisoner right after capture,
as the lower court judge ordered, the questioning of enemy combatants
would be stalled. Suppose, for example, that civil libertarians prevail
in future court hearings and enemy combatants receive a trial to test
their detention. To prove that a prisoner is a member of al Qaeda, the
soldiers and officers who captured and processed the prisoner would
have to be recalled from battle to appear in court, and would be sub-
jected to direct and cross examination.20 3 The Hamdi decision is an
absurd end result to both military and intelligence operations.20 4
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 20
5
In June 2006, the Supreme Court invalidated military commis-
sion tribunals for enemy combatants held at Guantanamo.2 °6 The
Hamdan Court held that military commissions fall outside of the inte-
grated system of military courts and procedures established by Con-
gress, and ruled the tribunals were unconstitutional as applied to both
citizens and non-citizens held at Guantanamo. 20 7 Congress quickly re-
sponded with the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, legislation
that, essentially, overruled Hamdan and stripped courts ofjurisdiction
over military commissions.20 8
Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting, argued that the Presi-
dent's decision to try Hamdan before a military commission is entitled
to a heavy measure of deference.20 9 In the present conflict on terror,
Thomas concluded, Congress authorized the President to use all neces-
sary force against those nations and organizations he determines
planned or aided the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Thomas concluded that
the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants is an impor-
tant incident of war, and therefore an exercise of the necessary force
Congress authorized the President to use. 210 Thomas concluded that
military and foreign policy judgments:
202 Yoo, supra note 25, at 147.
203 Id. at 162.
204 Id.
205 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
206 Id. at 2759
207 Douglas A. Hass, Crafting Military Commissions Post-Hamdan: The Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 82 IND. L.J. 1101, 1101 (2007).
208 Id.
209 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2825 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 2824.
2008]
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  273 2008
274 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 7:3
[A]re and should be undertaken only by those directly re-
sponsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judi-
ciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility
and which has long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.2 1 1
Both Hamdi and Hamdan illustrate that de novo judicial re-
view undermines the effectiveness of military efforts to thwart ter-
rorists. A habeas proceeding would become the forum for recalling
commanders and intelligence operatives from the field into open court,
disrupting overt and covert operations, revealing successful military
tactics and methods, and forcing the military to shape its activities to
the demands of the litigation process. Indeed, the discovery orders of
the trial judge in Hamdi threatened to achieve exactly these
results.2 12
U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) stated: "This habeas liti-
gation has consumed enormous resources and disrupted the day-to-
day operation of [the] Guantanamo naval base."21 3 He went on to
conclude:
The. . .litigation has imperiled crucial military opera-
tions during a time of war. In some instances, habeas
counsel have violated protective orders and jeopardized
the security of the base by giving detainees information
likely to cause unrest. Moreover, habeas counsel have
frustrated interrogation critical to preventing further
terrorist attacks on the United States.2 1 4
The Supreme Court's three decisions in Hamdi, Hamdan and
Rasul constitute an unprecedented departure from the traditionally
211 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 582-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Chicago & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
212 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513-14. The district court rejected the Mobbs Declaration
as insufficient to justify Hamdi's detention and ordered the Government to turn
over numerous materials for in camera review, including copies of all of Hamdi's
statements and the notes taken from interviews with him that related to his rea-
sons for going to Afghanistan and his activities therein; a list of all interrogators
who had questioned Hamdi and their names and addresses; statements by mem-
bers of the Northern Alliance regarding Hamdi's surrender and capture; a list of
the dates and locations of his capture and subsequent detentions; and the names
and titles of the United States Government officials who made the determinations
that Hamdi was an enemy combatant and that he should be moved to a naval brig.
213 Robin McDonald, Is Habeas Obsolete in the Age of Terrorism?, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, Oct. 11, 2006, available at www.dailyreportonline.com/site-
login.asp?origin=newsFilelO%2Fll%2F2006%4011963%2Ehtml.
214 Id.
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limited role of the courts with respect to warfare, ignoring centuries of
history and long standing judicial decisions. Both Justice Scalia and
Thomas wrote that "the plurality has appointed itself the ultimate ar-
biter of what is quintessentially a policy and military judgment."215
For the dissenters, the President has the power to appoint military
commissions in exigent circumstances, for that determination is the
kind for which the judiciary has neither the aptitude, nor responsibil-
ity. An order enjoining ongoing military commission proceedings
"brings the Judicial Branch into direct conflict with the Executive in
an area where the Executive's competence is maximal and ours is vir-
tually nonexistent."'2 16
Thus, the Supreme Court has now made the legal system part
of the problem, rather than part of the solution to the challenges of the
War on Terrorism. Their decisions mistake war for the familiarity of
the criminal justice system. What the justices have done would be un-
thinkable in prior military conflicts. They have chosen to directly in-
tervene in the military decisions of the President and Congress.217
D. The Padilla Case
The Fourth Circuit's decision in the Padilla case warrants
careful evaluation, for its detailed analysis of the issues surrounding
enemy combatants versus national security demands.218
Judge J. Michael Luttig opened his analysis emphasizing the
training which Padilla received from al Qaeda and its affiliates in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan. Padilla ostensibly met senior al Qaeda opera-
tions planner, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who directed that Padilla go
to the United States and destroy apartment buildings. When he re-
turned from international training, the FBI arrested Padilla in the
Chicago O'Hare Airport before he could implement the alleged plot.2 19
Padilla was transported to New York, where he was held at a civilian
prison until the President designated him an "enemy combatant" and
directed the Secretary of Defense to take him into military custody.
Since his delivery into the custody of military authorities, Padilla has
been detained at a naval brig in South Carolina.22 °
215 Jules Lobel, The Commander in Chief and the Courts, PRES. STUDIES QUAR-
TERLY, March 2007, at 59, available at http://www.blackwell-synergly.com/doi/pdf/
10.1111/j-1741-5705.2007.02584.x.
216 Id.
217 Yoo, supra note 25, at xi.
218 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
219 Id. at 388. The judge seemed to draw the factual allegations recounted in the
opinion from the U.S. factual statements in the joint appendix.
220 Id. at 390.
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Judge Luttig began his legal assessment with the idea that the
AUMF reaffirmed the war principle that allowed detentions to prevent
a combatant's return to the battlefield, a fundamental incident of wag-
ing war.22 1 Reasoning that the AUMF enabled individuals to be desig-
nated and imprisoned as enemy combatants, the judge asserted that
Padilla could be so labeled and confined as well. The judge stated that
Padilla, like Hamdi, took up arms in Afghanistan against Afghan
forces aligned with the United States.2 2 2
Padilla's lawyers argued that his military detention was
"neither necessary nor appropriate" because he was amenable to crimi-
nal prosecution. Related to this argument, Padilla attempts to distin-
guish Ex parte Quirin from his case on the grounds that he has simply
been detained, unlike Haupt who was charged and tried in Quirin.
Neither the argument nor the distinction was convincing to the
Court.2 2 3 The fact that Padilla could be prosecuted through traditional
criminal process did not distinguish him from Hamdi. Luttig con-
cluded by remarking:
We are convinced, in any event, that the availability of
criminal process cannot be determinative of the power to
detain, if for no other reason than that criminal prosecu-
tion may well not achieve the very purpose for which de-
tention is authorized in the first place-the prevention of
return to the field of battle. . . criminal prosecution
would impede the Executive in its efforts to gather intel-
ligence from the detainee and to restrict the detainee's
communication with confederates so as to ensure that
the detainee does not pose a continuing threat to na-
tional security even as he is confined... 2 2 4
Thus, the Fourth Circuit upheld executive power to detain in-
definitely U.S. citizens denominated "enemy combatants" in the War
on Terrorism. Exemplary of this is Judge Posner's argument for
weighting the balance in favor of the Executive Branch:
Civil liberties depend on national security in a broader
sense. Because they are the point of a balance between
security and liberty, a decline in security causes the bal-
ance to shift against liberty. An even more basic point is
that without physical security there is likely to be very
little liberty.2 2 5
221 Id. at 391 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion)).
222 Padilla, 423 F.2d at 391-92.
223 Id. at 394 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
224 Padilla, 423 F.2d at 394-95 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
225 POSNER, supra note 21, at 210. This conclusion occurs after a sustained criti-
cism of what so-called "civil libertarians" neglect, slight, and assume.
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E. United States v. Moussaoui 226
If one doubts that military commissions are the appropriate
venue for suspected terrorists, one need only examine the Zacarias
Moussaoui trial. The story of Moussaoui's trial and conviction demon-
strates why the civilian justice system is inadequate to the task of
fighting al Qaeda.22 7
Interrogation of al Qaeda leaders confirmed that Moussaoui
came to the United States either to be a backup pilot for the 9/11 plot
or a pilot in a second wave of attacks.2 2' The Justice Department in-
dicted Moussaoui in December of 2001 for conspiracy to commit terror-
ist attacks. At his trial, Moussaoui took every opportunity to
grandstand. He called a defense attorney a "Judas" at his April 2006
plea hearing. He was often removed from the courtroom for interrupt-
ing proceedings, pointing to his defense counsel, who he fired, yelling:
"I'm al Qaeda. They are American. They are my enemies. This trial is a
circus. ' '229 Moussaoui also wrote to Richard Reid, the shoe bomber,
who had been a member of the same mosque in London.2 3 °
Moussaoui openly admitted that he was a member of al Qaeda
and that he wanted to kill Americans in a second wave of attacks.2 3 1
His trial would have proceeded for years had Moussaoui not cooper-
ated and pleaded guilty on April 22, 2005, more than three and half
years after 9/11. Moreover, if Moussaoui had pressed his Sixth Amend-
ment right to have "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor," the trial could have gone on for years.2 3 2 In fact, the judge at
one point agreed that Moussaoui's constitutional right to a fair trial
required access to other enemy combatants. When the government re-
fused to produce the witnesses, the judge sanctioned them by ruling
out the death penalty.2 3 3
Courtroom maneuvers went on for another year as Moussaoui's
lawyers appealed again, ultimately to the Supreme Court, which de-
nied review of the case. After the Supreme court declined certiorari,
Moussaoui decided to plead guilty.
23 4
In May 2006, a Virginia jury sentenced Moussaoui to life in
prison. The end of the trial came almost five years after his arrest
226 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003).
227 Yoo, supra note 25, at 210.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 211.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 211-12.
233 Yoo, supra note 25, at 211-13.
234 Id. at 215.
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when Moussaoui yelled, "America you lost. I won."2 3 5 His histrionics
are significant. Those who believe the Moussaoui case demonstrates
that the criminal justice system, instead of a military tribunal, can try
terrorists have not paid close attention. If Moussaoui had chosen to
continue his litigation, as competent defense counsel would have, his
case would be ongoing. Moussaoui's trial clearly shows that civilian
courts, with juries, civil rights protections and the luxury of time, can-
not accommodate militant, enemy combatants in wartime.
VI. ARE MILITARY TRIBUNALS CONSTITUTIONAL?
The editorial page of the New York Times declared, "military
commissions do an end run around the Constitution .... and were an
insult to the exquisite balancing of executive, legislative and judicial
powers that the Framers incorporated into the Constitution.
236
The viewpoint expressed in the New York Times of the framers
intent is a mistaken one. Military commissions rest on centuries of
American practice, Supreme Court precedent and the Constitution's
text. The Constitution gives the President 'the business of intelligence'
and the conduct of war, according to John Jay, one of the authors of
The Federalist Papers.2 3 7 In Federalist No. 64 Jay explained that be-
cause Congress could not be trusted to keep secrets, the new Constitu-
tion had given the President the ability "to manage the business of
intelligence as prudence may suggest." Consider this 1800 statement
by John Marshall: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions.. .He possesses the whole Executive power.. .In this respect the
President expresses constitutionally the will of the nation.2 38
More specifically, President Bush issued an Executive Order
that created military commissions to try enemy combatants, "to pro-
tect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of
military operations and prevention of terrorists attacks."239 The Com-
missions provide as fair a trial as the world has known in the context
of war, and more due process safeguards than those of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.2 4 °
235 Id. at 210.
236 Id. at 205.
237 Exercising Congress's Constitutional Power to End War (Without in the Process
Breaking the Law): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Jud. (Jan. 30. 2007) (state-
ment of Robert F. Turner, Assoc. Dic. for the Ctr. of Nat. Sec. Law at Univ. of Va.).
238 Id.; 10 ANNALS OF CONG 613, reprinted in U.S. 5 Wheat (1820).
239 Yoo, supra note 25, at 206.
240 Id. at 207, 277 n.8. ("Under the ICC, a prosecutor who loses a case may appeal
the decision that is not possible under the military commissions...").
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"Enemy combatant" is a general category that subsumes two
sub-categories: lawful and unlawful combatants.2 4 ' Lawful combat-
ants receive prisoner of war (POW) status and the protections of the
Third Geneva Convention.2 4 2 Unlawful combatants do not receive
POW status and do not receive the full protections of the Geneva Con-
vention. 243 The President has determined that al Qaeda members are
unlawful combatants because (among other reasons) they are mem-
bers of a non-state actor, terrorist group.2 4 4 He additionally deter-
mined that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants because
they do not satisfy the criteria for POW status set out in Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention.2 4 5
"The military is far more capable of determining who an enemy
combatant is than a federal judge," Senator Lindsey Graham con-
cluded before his vote to enact the Military Commissions Act.24 6 "We
have replaced a system where the judges of this country can take over
military decisions and allow judges to review military decisions, once
made, for legal sufficiency. "247 Graham concluded:
We have rejected the idea as a Congress of allowing the
courts to run the war when it comes to defining who an
enemy combatant is . . .It is not destroying the writ of
habeas corpus. It is having a rational, balanced approach
to where the judges can play a meaningful role in time of
war and not play a role they are not equipped to play.2 4 8
Andrew C. McCarthy, the former federal prosecutor who con-
victed Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman for the Word Trade Center bombing
in 1993, has argued that the detainees at Guantanamo have no right
to habeas.2 4 9 McCarthy said that Congress, not the courts, should de-
cide how to deal with foreign terrorist suspects-as it has in the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006, both passed in response to Supreme Court rulings.2 50 McCarthy
argues that the Military Commissions Act does not actually suspend
241 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942).
242 Id.
243 Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dept. of De-
fense, to Members of the ASIL-CDR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http:/
/www.cfr.org/publication/5312./enemy-combatants.html.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 McDonald, supra note 213.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Meredith Hobbs, Lawyers Debate Rights vs. Security, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REPORT, March 27, 2007, available at http://dailyreportonline.com (search "Law-
yers Debate Rights vs. Security" in "Search Site").
250 Id.
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habeas because noncitizens have never had the right to habeas under
U.S. law.2 ' He added that a provision in the Detainee Treatment Act
that allows prisoners to ask the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit to review the tribunals' rulings effectively constitutes habeas
corpus.2 5 2 It is "reasonable to think they are dangerous or they would
not have been held," said McCarthy, adding that twenty of the detain-
ees who have been released have been recaptured on the battlefield.2 5 3
Civil libertarians have portrayed military commissions as some
sort of Frankenstein creation of the President. 25 4 Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. Military commissions are the customary form of
justice for enemy prisoners who violate the laws of war.2 55 They have
also served as courts of justice during occupations and in times of mar-
tial law. American generals have used military commissions in virtu-
ally every significant war from the Revolutionary War through World
War 11.256
Finally, military tribunals are imminently more secure from a
terrorist attack. Civil trials make inviting targets for al Qaeda.2 5 7
These trials also tend to be in major cities, such as New York, Wash-
ington and Miami, compounding loss of life if they were targeted for
attack. Currently, military tribunals are conducted at Guantanamo
Bay, a well-defended military compound far from major American pop-
ulation centers.2 58
A. Ex Parte Quirin 25 9
Under Article I, Section 8 powers, Congress has the authority
to provide for the creation of military commissions, 260 and can also au-
thorize the President to create such commissions. The Supreme Court
recognized the latter alternative when it upheld the President's power
to establish military commissions in the World War II cases of Ex
parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita.2 6 1 In fact, the current President's
order establishing military tribunals closely parallels President
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Yoo, supra note 25, at 220.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 219.
259 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curium); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
260 U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8.
261 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curium); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942); In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946).
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Franklin D. Roosevelt's proclamations pertaining to the Nazi saboteur
incident in the summer of 1942.262
In mid-June of 1942, eight German soldiers, after receiving ex-
tensive training in the techniques of sabotage, were transported by
submarine to the east coast of the United States, four coming ashore
on Long Island and four in Florida.263 They landed secretly at night
and buried their uniforms, along with explosives intended for use in
the destruction of various war facilities.264 However, two of the sabo-
teurs had second thoughts and provided the FBI with information
about the ill-conceived plot. 265 Before the end of June, all eight of the
saboteurs were incarcerated.266
President Roosevelt issued two military orders: the first of
which provided that enemies entering this country were subject to the
laws of war and the jurisdiction of military tribunals. 267 The order fur-
ther provided that "such persons shall not be privileged to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or have any
such remedy or proceeding sought in their behalf, in the courts of the
United States, or of its States...268 In the second order, Roosevelt set
up a military tribunal for trial of the Nazi saboteurs, relying on his
authority as "President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and
more particularly the Thirty-Eighth Article of War." 269
The saboteurs were provided with defense counsel, who peti-
tioned for habeas release °.27  The District Court denied the petitioners
applications for habeas corpus. 27' The Supreme Court justices, who
were scattered throughout the country during their summer recess,
heard oral arguments, rendered a brief per curiam decision in Ex Parte
Quirin and denied the defendants' habeas corpus petition.272 The
Court concluded that the "alleged offenses . . . could be tried by a mili-
tary commission, that the commission was lawfully constituted, and
that the petitioners were lawfully held for trial."273 The military trial
262 Stephens, supra note 19 at 74.
263 Id.; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
264 Stephens, supra note 19, at 74; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
265 Stephens, supra note 19, at 74.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 See id. at 75.
271 See Stephens, supra note 19, at 75; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
272 See Stephens, supra note 19, at 75; See also, Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
273 Stephens, supra note 19, at 75; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 2.
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proceeded, the defendants were convicted, and in early August 1942,
six of the eight defendants were executed. 4
Because of the important issues raised in Ex parte Quirin, on
October 29, 1942 the Supreme Court issued a separate, more elaborat-
ing opinion.2 7 5 Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Frank
Murphy not participating, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone distin-
guished this decision from the Court's famous Civil War era ruling in
Ex parte Milligan. 6
In Quirin, Justice Stone concluded that by entering the United
States armed with explosives intended for the destruction of war in-
dustries, these enemy combatants became unlawful belligerents sub-
ject to trial and punishment.17 7 Having found that the petitioners
were properly charged, the Supreme Court asserted that Roosevelt
was authorized to order their trials by a military commission.2
B. Military Commissions Act
The Military Commissions Act, signed by President Bush in
October 2006, stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the habeas
petitions of noncitizens detained at Guantanamo.2 7 9 The law was a re-
buke to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan.
Section 7 of the MCA is entitled "Habeas Corpus Matters" and
amends prior habeas rules to read:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy com-
batant or is awaiting such determination.
2 8 0
274 See Stephens, supra note 19, at 75.
275 Id.; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
276 Id.; see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). Military commissions were fre-
quently used to try both military personnel and civilians during the Civil War. For
the most part, the authority of these commissions was upheld. However, in Ex
parte Milligan, decided a year after the end of the war, the Supreme Court held
that the military trial of a civilian on charges of disloyalty outside the theater of
military operations, while the civil courts remained open, violated the defendant's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. "The Supreme Court held that martial law
could not "be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed."
277 See Stephens, supra note 19, at 75; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37.
278 Stephens, supra note 19, at 75; see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
279 Military Comissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-399 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.A. and 28 U.S.C.A.)
280 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2006). Senator Cornyn noted that "[O]nce... section 7 is
effective, Congress will finally accomplish what it sought to do through the [DTA]
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Before the MCA was enacted, Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-
Ga.) commented that, "[t]his is just one right that we don't have to give
them," he said, referring to Guantanamo detainees.28 ' Chambliss ad-
ded that the bill, once it becomes law, will cleanly sweep away at least
452 pending habeas lawsuits filed on behalf of Guantanamo Bay de-
tainees, specifically noting: "[olur intention is that this [bill] would
wipe those out.28 2 Holding hearings for every detainee in an ongoing
war would consume the federal government. Just imagine what it
would do to our system."28 3 Chambliss concluded that U.S. constitu-
tional protections do not extend to non-citizens living in the United
States who "[do] not have a substantial connection to the United
States" 284
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) agreed: "[n]ever in the his-
tory of the law of armed conflict," Graham told the Senate, "has a mili-
tary prisoner, an enemy combatant, been granted access to any court
system, federal or otherwise, to have a federal judge come in and start
running the prison."28 5 Graham's proposal, the MCA Act of 2006, in
essence, suspended habeas corpus for only the third time in American
history, following Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. 286
VII. PENDING SUPREME COURT CASES: BOUMEDIENE V.
BUSH AND AL-ODAH v. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court has drawn intense scrutiny by agreeing,
for a third time, to weigh in on the ongoing battle between the Presi-
dent and writs of habeas corpus.28 7 On June 29, 2007, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in two consolidated cases: Boumediene v.
Bush and Al-Odah v. United States.28 s
last year. It will finally get the lawyers out of Guantanamo Bay. It will substitute
the blizzard of litigation instigated by Rasul v. Bush with a narrow DC Circuit-
only review of the [CSRT] hearings." Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F. 3d 981, 986
(2007).
281 McDonald, supra note 50, at 4.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Novak, supra note 3.
286 Id.
287 Posting of Boumediene v. Bush to On the Docket, Blog of Medill School of Jour-
nalism, Northwestern University, available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.
edu/archives/004556.php.
288 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W.
3707 (U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195); Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134
(D.C.C. 2003), rev'd sub norm Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004), cert. granted, 75
U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1196).
2008]
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In 2002, Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerians were
captured by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected
their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy. 28 9 The prison-
ers were classified as enemy combatants and detained at Guanta-
namo. 29" Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause and inter-
national law.29 1
In the Boumediene cases, two cases involving seven detainees,
the district court judge, Judge Leon, granted the government's motion
and dismissed the cases in their entirety.2 9 2 He granted the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien
detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas peti-
tion.29 3 Similarly, the Al Odah cases (Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through
05-5116) consist of eleven cases involving fifty-six detainees.2 9 4 In the
Al Odah cases, Judge Green denied the government's motion to dis-
miss the claims arising from alleged violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and the Third Geneva Convention, but
dismissed all other claims.2 9 5 The government appealed and the de-
tainees cross-appealed.
On February 20, 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, es-
sentially, dismissed these cases for lack of jurisdiction.29 6 The court
framed the central legal issue as follows: Do federal courts have juris-
diction over writs of habeas corpus filed by aliens captured abroad and
detained as enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in
Cuba?29 7 In answering the question the court observed that each of
petitioners' pending habeas cases related to the detention of an 'alien'
after September 11, 2001. The court concluded that the Military Com-
missions Act (MCA) applies to those cases and eliminates federal juris-
diction over the petitions.298 The court specifically held that the MCA
Act of 2006 "shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of
289 Novak, supra note 3.
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005); Boumediene, 476 F.3d at
984.
293 Novak, supra note 3.
294 Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 984.
295 Id. at 984 (citing In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443
(D.D.C. 2005)).
296 Id at 995.
297 Id. at 984.
298 See generally Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of
an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001."2 99
More importantly, perhaps, the court reasoned that the Consti-
tution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence
within the United States. 30 0 The court went on to hold that the MCA
statute does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, as
the Suspension Clause protects the writ of habeas corpus "as it existed
in 1789," and the writ in 1789 would not have been available to aliens
held at an overseas military base leased from a foreign government.30 1
The court held that, as aliens outside the sovereign territory of the
United States, petitioners have no constitutional rights under the Sus-
pension Clause.30 2 The court observed that in Eisentrager, the Su-
preme Court "rejected the proposition 'that the Fifth Amendment
confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever
they are located and whatever their offenses.'" 303
Finally, the court addressed the detainee's argument that fed-
eral courts retain common law jurisdiction over habeas petitions, quot-
ing Ex parte Bollman: "Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
is.. .limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of
jurisdiction."30 4 Moreover, the observations about the idea of common
law habeas in Rasul referred to the practice in England, not the
United States.30 5 The court concluded that even if there were such a
thing as common law jurisdiction in the federal courts, section 7 of the
MCA quite clearly eliminates all jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a detainee, whatever the
source of that jurisdiction. 30 6
The cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, and oral argu-
ments were heard on December 5, 2007.307 A potentially landmark de-
cision is pending.
299 Id. at 986.
300 Id. at 990.
301 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1000.
302 See generally Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 981.
303 Id. at 991 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950)).
304 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807).
305 Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988 n.5.
306 Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 701 (1982)).
307 Oyez.org, Supreme Court Media, Boumediene v. Bush, Oral Arguments, avail-
able at http://www.oyez.orgicases/2000-2009/2007/200706-1195/argument/.
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A. Boudemine v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States: Oral
Argument
Consider the following exchange between Justice Scalia and
Mr. Waxman, who represented some of the detainees at Guantanamo:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Your assertion here is that there is a
common law constitutional right of habeas corpus that
does not depend upon any statute. Do you have a single
case in the 220 years of our country or, for that matter,
in the five centuries of the English empire in which
habeas was granted to an alien in a territory that was
not under the sovereign control of either the United
States or England?
MR. WAXMAN: The answer to that is a resounding yes.
JUSTICE SCALIA: What are they?... [Y]ou are appeal-
ing to a common law right that somehow found its way
into our constitution without, as far as I can discern, a
single case in which the writ ever to a non-citizen.
30 8
Further in the argument, the President's position on enemy
combatants was summed up by the Solicitor General Clement:
Since this Court's decision in Rasul, Petitioners' status
has been reviewed by a tribunal modeled on Army Regu-
lation 190-8, and Congress has passed two statutes ad-
dressing Petitioners' rights. Petitioners now have access
to the Article III courts and have a right to judicial re-
view in the D.C. Circuit. That review encompasses pre-
ponderance claims, claims that the military did not
follow their own regulations, and statutory and constitu-
tional claims... So they are given a right to a personal
representative, which is not something that Army Regu-
lation 190-8 provides. They are specifically provided for
the ability to submit documentary evidence... And Con-
gress here has spoken... The political branch has spo-
ken. They have struck a balance. They've given these
detainees better rights and access to administrative and
judicial review. 30 9
308 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
1694 (2008) (No. 06-1195), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-
arguments/argument-transcripts/06-1195.pdf.
309 Id. at 32-33.
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Scalia noted later in the oral argument that, "Counsel, we had
400,000 German prisoners in this country during World War II. And
not... a single habeas petition filed."3 1°
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. "What Would Jack Bauer Do?"31'
Jack Bauer does not exist, and "24" is made-for-TV entertain-
ment, but his toxic tactics against suspected terrorists have focused a
festering debate on what legal rights suspected terrorists have in our
judicial or military system.312
There is no doubt that the attacks of September 11th consti-
tuted acts of war.3 13 The attacks possessed the intensity and scale of
war.314 They involved at least one prime military target, the Pentagon,
and they came on the heels of a decade of brutal attacks by al Qaeda
on U.S. military and civilian targets.315 War implicates legal powers
and rules that are not available during times of peace. 31 6 Among other
things, the 9/11 attack should give the President the extraordinary au-
thority to detain enemy combatants at least until hostilities cease.317
Thus, the President should be emancipated from frivolous liti-
gation. The intelligence community should have the speed and agility
to protect our nation without the fear of needing to create extra judi-
cial protections for foreign terrorists.31 8 If we are to stay ahead of ex-
tremists determined to attack the United States, the President must
be able to effectively obtain information gained through laws such as
the USA PATRIOT Act and The Protect America Act.31 9
Legalists in cases like Padilla and Hamdi, who claim that the
military can only detain uniformed members of armed forces captured
310 High Court Warily Weighs Long Gitmo Detentions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2007, at A5.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
1694 (2008) (No. 06-1195), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/06-1195.pdf.
311 Patrick J. Buchanan, What Would Jack Bauer Do?, HumanEvents.com,
Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=11777&keywords=%
5C%22GUANTANAMO%5C%22
312 Id.
313 William J. Haynes II, Memorandum to Council on Foreign Relations, Members
of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable, Subject: Enemy Combatants, Dec. 12, 2002, availa-
ble at http://www.cfr.org/publication/5312/enemy-combatants.html
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Mike McConnell, Editorial, ST.PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at All.
319 Id.
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in battle, are blind to the realities of the post-9/11 world. This flawed
legal reasoning ties our military's hands precisely because radical
jihadists target civilians on our own soil, and issues a further invita-
tion to al Qaeda to stop fighting conventional battles: no more Tora
Boras-just more World Trade Centers.3 2 °
Seven years without a terrorist attack has given critics the op-
portunity to challenge the need for preventive detention, targeted kill-
ing, the USA PATRIOT Act, coercive interrogation, and military
tribunals. Yet, because of these legally aggressive tactics, the Ameri-
can public has not seen the deaths these tactics have prevented. None-
theless, al Qaeda is a threat because it attacks in disguise and targets
civilians. Bin Laden himself declared in 1998: "[w]e do not have to
differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned,
they are all targets."32 1 It is perplexing that civil libertarian absolut-
ists would grant al Qaeda criminal justice protections, effectively re-
warding terrorists for violating every law of war ever devised.
The notion of gifting habeas rights to captured terrorists
speaks to the shocking disconnect between those who acknowledge
that we are at war, and those in the judiciary who imagine we are
dealing with petty criminals.
Advocates of civil liberties litigation argue that we must create
unprecedented legal rights in the name of preserving fair play.3 2 2 Na-
tions do not prevail in war because of their sense of Due Process. The
War on Terrorism is unique: we face an uncommonly merciless foe. It
has been more than seven years since we were attacked, and we con-
tinue to judicially dither over the status of terrorists.3 2 3 These men
are prisoners taken in a time of war.32 ' The fact that the war may
extend beyond their lifetimes is the bad fortune of those captured.3 25
The judicial process, intended to protect the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans, has been judicially manipulated. Courts are ill-
equipped to second guess the President's determination that national
security considerations require limited judicial review.3 2 s The expan
sive interpretation of the Suspension Clause being pressed by some
320 Yoo, supra note 25, at 147.
321 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 40.
322 See Christopher Plante, Al Qaeda Membership Has its Privileges,
HumanEvents.com, May 11, 2007, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=
20665.
323 See id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Brief of Retired Generals and Admirals et at. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 15, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195) (Oct. 9, 2007).
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lawyers is inconsistent with the courts' historical deference to the
elected branches of government on foreign policy issues.327
The federal judiciary is a slow, deliberate body whose ability to
process information is more limited than the political branches.328 Al-
though the presumption of innocence is fundamental in the criminal
context, in a war in which our enemy targets civilians as a primary
military strategy, we cannot afford to confer on radical terrorists the
same rights we grant ordinary criminals or even military adversaries
in a traditional conflict.3 29 The conduct of war-a core component of
which is the handling of enemy prisoners-is a fundamental political
responsibility, not a legal one. 330
B. 'National Security Court'
Since the criminal justice system is not suited to the realities of
this new kind of war, this article supports the constitution of a new
type of court, "the national security court."33' Although it is the au-
thor's position that alien combatants do not have full and complete
constitutional rights, that does not mean they fall into a legal black
hole.332 Using traditional courts to combat international terrorism
does not work as a national security strategy. This article advocates
establishing a new, national security court to deal with suspected
terrorists.333
The national security court would be modeled on the existing
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court, but with broader oversight
than electronic surveillance. 334 This secret court would be the venue to
make decisions on what to do with suspected terrorists. 335 Although
the prisoners at Guantanamo fall outside of the established regime of
law,336 that does not mean they lack fundamental rights. But those
rights should be consistent with military success. A new court tailored
to handle suspected terrorists in a parallel legal system could alleviate
327 See id. at 9.
328 Jules Lobel, The Commander in Chief and the Courts, 37.1 PRES. STUDIES Q.
49, 62, Mar. 2007.
329 Linda Chavez, U.S. Terrorist Policy Vindicated, HumanEvents.com, Nov. 16,
2005, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id= 10322&keywords=TERROR
IST.
330 See generally id.
331 See Meredith Hobbs, Lawyers Debate Rights vs. Security, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Mar. 27, 2007, at 3.
332 Id.
333 See id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
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this problem, and obviate needless litigation in criminal or civil
courts.3 3 7
The national security court would be the historic compromise
between protecting a nation's secrets, its ability to conduct war, and
Due Process for the accused. It would be flexible enough to respect the
needs of wartime and bring more expertise than a civilian court. In
sum, this national security court is the appropriate venue for these
types of trials.
In the final analysis, the President, in times of war, cannot be
constrained by the fear of chilling litigation. In fact, the fear of litiga-
tion restricts the conduct of war and makes it more difficult to protect
the American people. 33 ' The President has been strangled by law.
33 9
This fear of litigation presents a conflict for any President between the
dread of another attack, and the countervailing hesitation of violating
electronic surveillance law.3 40
Al Qaeda is still dangerous. It is resilient, ideologically driven,
and draws comfort from the well of anti-Americanism that exists in
the Middle East. We must take aggressive legal action to defeat al
Qaeda, while adapting the rules of war to address the enemies of the
twenty-first century. Perhaps, Andrew McCarthy, the former federal
prosecutor, summed the stakes up succinctly when he concluded: "[i]t
is more important for the U.S. to win the war on terrorism than it is
for any enemy combatant to get justice."3 4 '
As Americans committed to constitutional law, we are con-
flicted. While we believe in constitutional rights, human rights, and
Miranda warnings, we also believe in winning our wars. For without
victory in the War on Terror, constitutional freedom may not
survive.
3 42
337 Hobbs, supra note 331, at 3.
338 See Barone, supra note 11, at 1 (referencing arguments made in JACK GOLD-
SMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (W. W. Norton 2007)).
339 Barone, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESI-
DENCY (W. W. Norton 2007)).
340 Id.
341 Hobbs, supra note 249, at 4.
342 Buchanan, supra note 311.
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